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 1 
Law Making Music 
“One reason we turn to painting and music and nature is in fact to move, or to try to move, 
beyond the world of our languages.” – James Boyd White, The Edge of Meaning.1 
 
There is something hopeful in the fact that nature makes sounds and humans make music. 
Part of the hope lies in the fact that human appreciation of music opens up a way for human 
appreciation of nature. Another part lies in the fact that the appreciation of sound as music 
connects human to human in ways that cannot be achieved by words.  
When writing at the interdisciplinary intersection of law and music, articulation is 
everything. To articulate means to join parts together. It works in a way that does not freeze 
the parts, but frees them. The elbow, for example, articulates the upper and lower arm to 
enable movement. Articulation also makes a difference between the parts even as it unites 
them. The elbow, far from eliding the distinction between the parts, is the very thing that 
makes the distinction between the upper arm and lower arm as elements of the whole. So it is 
with articulate speech and writing. The clear distinction of one thought from another within 
an extended speech or text is only possible where distinct phrases are appropriately 
connected. Many years ago, Marc Stauch, a jurist and composer, said to me that in his view 
the key to clear expression is the appropriate use of conjunctions – the ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘but’, 
 
1 James Boyd White, The Edge of Meaning (Chicago: Univ of Chicago Press, 2001) 1. I 
would like to record at the outset my thanks to the careful reviewers of this piece, anonymous 
and known;  including my colleague John Snape for his detailed suggestions. I also 
acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust  through the award of a Major Research 
Fellowship. 
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‘because’, ‘therefore’ and so forth. The elegance and clarity of exposition is certainly to be 
found not only in the clause as a closed part of linguistic expression, but also, and perhaps 
more so, in the words and phrases by which clauses are joined. When engaging in any 
interdisciplinary endeavour – including the study of law and music – attention to the joints 
becomes especially significant. We must attend not only to the law and to the music, but to 
the “and”. Where an interdisciplinary endeavour crosses cultural contexts – for instance from 
indigenous to colonial, or ancient to modern – the ligature comes under extreme stress and is 
at risk of becoming a point of weakness and pain; injury is always threatened. It is, though, 
important to attend to the elbow if one is going to work the arm. If it matters to work across 
law and music and across different cultural conceptions of both, it is pivotal to engage with 
the joint. One way of expressing my concern in this essay is to say that it is concerned with 
the nature of the ‘fit’. I have approached that same concern in other ways before, for example 
by attending to the fit between disciplines; and to the fit between strict law and the shape of 
life that judges achieve through the flexible articulation of equity. The present aim is to 
attend to the practice of joining as a mode of making. To express that aim in the language of 
music, it might be said that I am concerned to appreciate the craft of composition with special 
reference to the art of harmonization. 
The etymological connection between “art” and “articulation” is obvious enough, but 
the connection between “articulation” and “harmonization” is more subtle and just as strong. 
Derived from the conjectured Proto-Indo-European (PIE) root *ar- “to fit together”, ἁρμονία 
(“armonia”) in the Greek indicated “joining, joint, agreement”.2 It denoted musical concord 
and concord between all the arts of the Muses (Euripides writes that “the nine Pierian Muses 
 
2 Oxford English Dictionary. 
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gave birth to fair-haired Harmonia”),3 but also such activities as joining planks to make a 
ship.4 Related to harmos, the “fastenings of a door; joint, shoulder”;5 the sense in both 
shoulder and ship is of joining parts for the purpose of producing movement.6 Joining is not 
the end point, but the point from which movement becomes possible. Harmony naturally 
came to be employed to describe the quality of a society in which all parts live together in 
civil peace. It is often still so employed to describe the legal ordering of society, although 
jurists frequently make the mistake of supposing that harmonization (as in the harmonization 
of laws between different nations) means unification by the removal of differences rather 
than the quite opposite project of unifying through the accommodation and articulation of 
differences.7 The word “order” is another word cognate with the PIE root *ar-, and is key to 
 
3 Medea in D. Kovacs trans., Euripides: Cyclops. Alcestis. Medea Loeb Classical Library 12 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), line 830. 
4 Herodotus Histories 2.96.2. 
5 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1940). In 
relation to the hinge of a door, see, for example, Euripedes Medea (n.3 above) line 1315.  
6 The knee is another significant locus of articulation in law. For example, in the feudal 
ceremony of homage that stood at the heart of feudal property relations in respect of land, the 
vassal was required to kneel and kiss the hand of his liege lord. For a more ancient example 
see T. Zartaloudis, “Hieros anthropos – an inquiry into the practices of archaic Greek 
supplication” (2019) 13:1 Law and Humanities 52-75. 
7 I commend to the reader Robert Leckey’s rhapsody on the form and substance of legal 
harmonization (“‘Rhapsodie Sur La Forme Et Le Fond De L’Harmonisation Juridique’ 
(2010) 51 Les Cahiers de Droit 3–49) as an example to the contrary. It takes seriously the 
musical sense of harmonization of different parts. 
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connecting law and music within our present concern for the practice of joining. Making 
music depends upon the harmony of parts; making laws in parliament depends upon the 
ordering or articulation of articles within a legislative whole. The etymology of parliament as 
a place of “speaking” (parlement) reminds us that parliament is a workshop of acoustic 
articulation. Judges also make laws in court through a process of articulation, not only in the 
sense that articulate speech is essential to adjudication (etymologically “speaking justice”), 
but also in the sense that judgment involves a fitting of law to the materials of life. In the 
present essay I will not neglect the courtroom, but my main focus will be on the forum of the 
legislative chamber. 
The word “chamber” suggests isolation and exclusion, but if exclusionary walls are 
implied then so too are inclusionary doors. Auditory and vocal chambers – whether they are 
chambers of the human head, chambers of parliament, judges’ and barristers’ chambers, “or” 
(I do not use “or” to imply that these examples are mutually exclusive) the chambers in 
which chamber music is played – cannot work without connection between inside and out. 
The principal actors and the audience must have means of ingress and egress. The door or 
threshold is an architectural point of articulation; joining the outside to the inside even as it 
marks the line of separation between them. Even when the door is closed in the doorway, it 
still stands as a sign of access, and sound still seeps through, however muffled, from one side 
to another. I am dwelling on the point of connection between inside and out in order to  
emphasize the part played by public or audience participation in the production of legislative 
harmony. The argument is that we should see the public as co-producers of the parliamentary 
music and as joint makers (and joint-makers) of the law. The question of public participation 
is important, because, however much the voice of the public is distorted within parliament, 
the House of Commons is ultimately answerable to the public as an echo is answerable to its 
source. The voting public, not their parliamentary representatives, are the continuous 
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unifying authority of the law. As Paul W. Kahn puts it: “Individual legislators may disappear 
from social memory, but the law continues to be our own”.8 Musical analogies to this 
phenomenon readily present themselves. For example, Martin Loughlin (writing in the 
context of constitutional law) discusses Carl Schmitt’s use of the choral analogy: 
 
The song of a choir, ... [Schmitt] argues analogically, remains that same even “if the 
people singing or performing change or if the place where they perform changes”, 
because “unity and order resides in the song and the score, just as the unity and order 
of the state resides in its constitution”.9 
 
This essay proceeds in parts, and this paragraph outlines the scheme for joining them 
together into what is hopefully a harmonious whole. The first part introduces an exemplary 
musical event that occurred in the debating chamber of the New Zealand parliament in 2017. 
To call it a “musical” event can only do it justice if we have an enlarged sense of music in 
mind.10 The second part advances a way of approaching musical appreciation as a mental 
 
8 P. W. Kahn, Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016) 56. 
9 C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (1928), trans. J. Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008) 
60, quoted in M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 213. From J. 
Snape, “Constitution: Handel’s Solomon and the Constitution at Covent Garden” in R. 
Probert and J. Snape eds., A Cultural History of Law in the Age of Enlightenment (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2019) 40. 
10 The enlarged Greek sense of music (mousikē) as the arts of the Muses is considered in Part 
Three. 
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activity which, by joining sound to musical meaning not only makes musical sense of sound 
but can also, in so doing, be said to participate in the process of making music. Crucial to the 
move from making sense of music to making music, is the notion that music is inherently a 
metaphorical way of thinking about sound; one in which the music metaphor operates by 
making sound humanly meaningful. The third part – proceeding from the idea that music 
operates as metaphor and, like all metaphor, produces meaning by translating abstractions 
into concrete conceptions – posits music as a bridge (a joint or articulation) between eras, 
cultures and social strata that might otherwise struggle to find meaningful points of 
connection and communication. Key to this idea of music as articulation is the expectation 
that thinking musically and metaphorically is the best way to imagine and realize harmonious 
relations between distinct and diverse places and people.  We might ultimately understand 
law making music in the sense both of “law making” music and law “making music”.  
 
Part One: Waiata in the New Zealand Parliament 
The exemplary event with which I will commence, and to which we will repeatedly return, 
took place on 14 March 2017 in the debating chamber of the New Zealand parliament on the 
Third Reading of Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill (referred to 
hereafter as the “Third Reading”). The Bill received assent and became Te Awa Tupua 
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 on 20 March 2017 (hereafter the “2017 
Act”).11  Engaging with this legislation, the title of an article in the Ecology Law Quarterly 
 
11 NZ Public Act 2017 No 7. 
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poses this singularly stimulating question “Can You Hear the Rivers Sing”?12 It is gratifying 
to read that the authors believe with me that we can answer “yes” if we allow metaphoric 
imagination to open our ears. 
The “subject” of the Act, and we can now use that word in the official sense of a legal 
subject having legal personhood,13 is The Whanganui river in New Zealand. It is the third 
longest of  New Zealand’s rivers, and, most pertinent in terms of its relationship to humans, it 
is New Zealand’s longest navigable river. It is therefore fitting that the 2017 Act settled the 
longest-running litigation in New Zealand history.14 The “Te Awa Tupua” in the title of the 
Act might be translated “Ancestral River”, and the connections run deep between the river 
and the lore, law and song of its human community (the Whanganui iwi).  
 
[Te Awa Tupua] is the Māori way of viewing the river as a whole, an integrated entity 
from the mountains to the sea. According to Māori customs, the river consists of the 
water, the riverbed, the tributaries, the banks, the flats, and the catchment area. The 
spiritual and physical connection of the Whanganui iwi to the river can be 
encompassed by the tribal proverb: “Ko au te awa. Ko te awa ko au,” which means “I 
 
12 C. Clark, N. Emmanouil, J. Page and A. Pelizzon, “Can You Hear the Rivers Sing? Legal 
Personhood, Ontology, and the Nitty-Gritty of Governance” (2018) 45 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 787-844. 
13 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, section 14(1): “Te Awa 
Tupua is a legal person and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person”.  
14 Press Release, Christopher Finlayson, “Whanganui River Settlement Passes Third 
Reading” (15 March 2017). The litigation spanned in various forms over 150 years, mostly in 
response to the physical exploitation of the River.  
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am the river, the river is me”. The concept behind Te Awa Tupua is that it is not a 
geographical location, but rather a recognition of the river system as a whole with 
specific interests and intrinsic values of its own. 
The river iwi perceive their own health and wellbeing as intrinsically 
interconnected with the health and wellbeing of the Whanganui River. “The 
inseparability of the people and the Whanganui River underpins the responsibility of 
the Whanganui iwi to care for, protect, manage, and use the Whanganui River” 
(Wanganui District Council).15  
 
“Te Awa Tupua” seems to this outsider to be a great expression, a prodigious articulation, 
that joins all parts human and natural into a harmonious expression of life. When the power 
of that expression encountered the opposing flow of the crown and the common law’s notion 
of private property, prolonged conflict ensued. In the end, Te Awa Tupua prevailed, but the 
peace treaty between Te Awa Tupua  and the common law, which required the common law 
to recognize the river as a legal personality, came at the inevitable cost of Te Awa Tupua  
being recognised as a legal subject. That cost has at least two dimensions. First, the 
significant spiritual, sentimental and symbolic cost of subjecting Te Awa Tupua to human 
sovereignty to the extent inherent in the very act of legal recognition by the crown and 
common law. Second, the fact that a legal subject capable of bearing rights must also be 
capable of bearing responsibilities, which in the case of Te Awa Tupua are borne vicariously 





In a helpful summary of the legal position, as seen from the common law perspective, 
Christopher Rodgers of Newcastle University, UK, notes that: 
 
The settlement, and the 2017 Act which implements it, confers legal personality on 
the river system, giving it a unique legal status that recognises not only the need to 
protect the ecosystem it represents, but also to provide a legal forum in which to 
implement Maori cultural and spiritual attitudes to the relationship of land and people. 
It can be argued this marks a new and innovative approach to protecting the 
environment, focusing at the ecosystem level and incorporating spiritual values in a 
manner unknown in environmental law in most Western legal systems.16 
 
I entirely agree, and with that “new and innovative approach” comes a new hope for the 
future performance and reform of UK law. Rodgers goes on to explain that  
 
The Act establishes the office of Te Pou Tupua. This will carry out functions 
analogous to those of a trustee, with an overriding duty to uphold the Te awa Tupua 
status, to promote and protect the health and wellbeing of Te awa Tupua, to carry out 
landowner functions on land held by the Te awa Tupua, and to carry out various 
ancillary functions of a trusteeship nature. One trustee will be nominated by the iwi 
with interests in the Whanganui river, and one will be nominated on behalf of the 
 
16 C. Rodgers, “A new approach to protecting ecosystems: The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui 
River Claims Settlement) Act 2017” (2017) 19(4) Environmental Law Review 266–
279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461452917744909 (This summary is taken from the abstract to 
the article). 
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crown. A distinctive facet of the trusteeship role of the Te Pou Tupua is their 
obligation to uphold the Tupua te Kawa. This is a broad concept that encompasses 
both the physical and spiritual aspects of the environment provided by the Whanganui 
river system (the ‘intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te awa Tupua’) 
[footnotes omitted].17 
 
Making the point that the rights of Te Awa Tupua exercised by Te Pou Tupua bring 
corresponding responsibilities, Rodgers notes that “the trustees will be potentially liable in 
private law suits brought…for example, in private nuisance as regards the use of land”, and 
“[a]s a public body, their decisions will also be potentially open to judicial review”.18 
 What Rodgers does not mention is that the legislative Act of the New Zealand 
parliament was not the only performative act of making that took place in the parliamentary 
debating chamber on the climactic occasion of the Third Reading. The authors of “Can You 
Hear the Rivers Sing”? highlight the fact that members of the Whanganui iwi “sang a waiata 
in the parliamentary chamber in celebration”.19 In celebration certainly, but also, it might be 
said, by way of endorsement or sealing of the performance and accordingly by way of 
making the law complete. The music and the movement of the waiata can be understood to 
express, through the mouths and bodies of the Whanganui iwi, something like the river’s own 
 
17 Rodgers, ibid., 270. In November 2017, Dame Tariana Turia and Whanganui iwi 
Poukōrero (tribal historian) Turama Hawira were the first people to appointed to the office of 
Te Pou Tupua. 
18 Rodgers, ibid., 274. 
19 Clark, “Rivers Sing”, at 800. Another waiata was sung at the First Reading of the Bill and 
can be accessed at www.parliament.nz/en/watch-parliament/video. 
 11 
assent to being made a legal person. The waiata was delivered from the public gallery, which 
comprises raked rows of seating located in a balcony running along the sides of the chamber 
so that members of the public can look down on the legislative business taking place on the 
floor below. The equivalent space in the Chamber of the House of Commons in the Palace of 
Westminster in the United Kingdom is subtly but significantly different, for the section 
dedicated to the general public is located only at one end of the chamber, immediately above 
the main entrance. This makes clear the threshold presence of the general public as being in, 
but not wholly within, the chamber; an impression confirmed by the addition in 2004 of a 
glass screen separating that section from the rest of the debating chamber. The location of the 
public gallery at one end of the chamber gives the impression that the public are in a sort of 
minstrels’ gallery, but one in which they are required to be silent. The silence of the minstrels 
above in contrast to the cacophony of the ministers below strikes a melancholy note in a 
minor key,20 and one that is an affront to its musical potential. 
The authors of “Can You Hear the Rivers Sing”? explain that waiata “is a traditional 
Māori song, sung at ceremonial or commemorative occasions, or as songs of love, lament, or 
mourning”.21 Watching the video recording, one needs no translation of the words to 
understand that the waiata of March 2017 expresses both joyfulness and mournfulness; and 
 
20 Peter Goodrich explores the small but significant connection between ministers of state and 
the minstrel’s art in his article “How Strange the Change from Major to Minor” (2017) 21 
Law Text Culture 30-53, at 31 (http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol21/iss1/3). 
21 Clark, “Rivers Sing”, at 800. For more detail on waiata, the reader might consult Te Ara: 
The Encyclopedia of New Zealand (teara.govt.nz) and the books of Mervyn McLean, 
including Maori Music (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), ch.3: “Sung Song and 
Dance Styles”.  
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why should it not mourn, given the fact that in order to acquire legal personhood and the 
protection of legal rights it is necessary for Te Awa Tupua to become a subject of law? The 
authors of “Can You Hear the Rivers Sing”?  attach significance to the role of metaphor in 
the language of the waiata, quoting from Te Ara (Encyclopaedia of New Zealand), which 
states that “[t]he emotionally charged circumstances under which waiata [are] composed are 
reflected in their highly poetic language, . . . rich with allusion, metaphor and imagery”. They 
emphasize the narrative nature of the waiata, noting that: 
 
The Whanganui Claims Settlement Act is a legal instrument that sings a powerful 
narrative, a song strangely at one with both the Māori waiata, and the common law’s 
occasional turn to narrative.22 
 
Their emphasis on narrative as a point of commonality between the waiata and the common 
law is a sensible attempt to bridge the gap between the Whanganui iwi and the crown at the 
shortest possible point of crossing. This does not imply that our attention should be focused 
solely upon narrative in the form of words. The message is also to be found in the music, the 
movement, and in all aspects of the “mise en scène” appreciated as an integrated ceremonial 
whole. A lesson I am still learning after years of approaching one scholarly community (say 
that of music) whilst carrying the baggage of another community (say that of law or 
literature) is that one’s baggage always contains in its folds the fleas of the former place, and 
the former place inevitably has its own peculiar infections and inflections. With that caution 
in mind, the reader might join me in approaching the recording of the performance of the 
waiata on the occasion of the Third Reading. It can be accessed via YouTube and through the 
 
22 Clark, “Rivers Sing”, at 801. 
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NZ parliament’s official website.23 It made a great impression on me. I cannot translate the 
words into English any more than I can translate the sounds of the river itself, but that might 
be a significant part of what made the waiata for me, in a resolutely unromantic way, a 
meaningful and moving event. In a forum accustomed to formal speech and formal 
movement all framed by formal architecture, the music and movement of the waiata seems to 
flood over the legislative benches. Private property has traditionally enclosed the natural 
world within artificial bounds, in something like the way that built banks regulate and 
conduct the waters of a canal.  Here, in the waiata, the waters push back and break the banks. 
The music of the river refuses to be conducted by the common law. No doubt every person 
coming to the performance of the waiata as it is reproduced in the YouTube clip will make 
something new of it. What is particularly exciting is its potential to make something new of 
us and of our law – whoever the “us” and “our” might be. For lawyers working in the 
traditions of Anglo-Saxon-based  common law and Roman-based civil law, such a renewal 
will not entail fresh invention so much as the re-creation of ligatures that once articulated law 
to the wider life of the community, and to the whole life of the person; even to the emotional 
life associated with the forensically forbidden domain of feelings.  The notion that law can 
and should operate in a logical vacuum insulated from human emotions and passions – so 
well expressed in the lawyer Jaggers’ outburst “Get out of this office. I’ll have no feelings 
here”24 – is as false and dangerous as the idea of a law made entirely of feelings at the 
 
23www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansarddebates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20170314_20170315_1
2 (the entire video archive is accessible at www.parliament.nz/en/watch-parliament/video). 
24 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (first published serially in All the Year Round, 1860-
61) ch. 51. 
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expense of logic. What is required is to articulate the forensic to the feeling, or  – in the 
words of another literary quote – to “connect the prose and the passion”.25 
In this spirit, Margaret Werry writes that the performance of waiata “conducts and 
amplifies powerful affects”, adding that “Sensitivity to these affects… is a way of registering 
the appearance of the non-human through the performance of the human”.26 She refers to a 
speech delivered by MP Marama Fox at the Third Reading, in which she invoked elders of 
the Whanganui iwi who had died during the lengthy litigation leading to the Settlement of the 
river’s personhood: 
Their waiata and whakataukī, and their karanga and karakia provide other means to 
understand te mana o te awa [the mana of the river]. They help describe the heart and 
soul from which to interpret te mana o te iwi… They told us: “Kauaka e kōrero mō Te 
Awa ēngari, kōrero ki Te Awa!” [“Do not talk about the River but speak to it!”] So, 
we too went to the River. (New Zealand Legislation 2017a, 9–10)27 
 
25 E. M. Forster, Howards End (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), ch.22. We will return to this 
quote later when we discuss its relevance in the context of the novel. 
26 M. Werry, “What’s Left of Rights? Arendt And Political Ontology In The Anthropocene” 
(2019) 5.1 Performance Philosophy 1–17, 13 (doi.org/10.21476/PP.2019.51275). Citing 
Charles Te Ahukaramū Royal, “Te Whare Tapere: Towards a New Model for Māori 
Performing Arts.” PhD diss. (Victoria University of Wellington, 1998). 
27 Werry, ibid., 13-14.Translations taken from https://maoridictionary.co.nz are as follows: 
whakataukī (proverbs); karanga (ceremonial call of welcome); karakia (ritual chant) mana 
(prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, charisma - mana is a 
supernatural force in a person, place or object).  
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Werry senses that 
The tears of the kaumātua and kuia (elders) in the gallery and the MPs on the floor as 
these waiata, karanga, and karakia were performed, the power and fullness of their 
performance, were not a wholly human affair; they were a very complex form of 
spokespersonship, a speaking to and for, a listening and interpreting, a presencing and 
co-presencing, a braiding of human and non-human, by which the Whanganui made 
an appearance…And so, a river ran through parliament.28 
Werry’s word “braiding” depicts, better even than “articulation”, the intimacy of the making 
process by which differences are joined together into an integrated whole through the waiata. 
Thinking in similar metaphoric terms, Mervyn McLean chose Weavers of Song for the title to 
his 1995 monograph on Polynesian music and dance.29 Approaching the recording of the 
waiata as an outsider (and conscious as I am that I am talking about the River and not 
speaking to it), I am struck by the sense of order and authority it conveys. No doubt that 
sense is prompted in part by the fact that the singing is choral and the accompanying hand 
gestures are coordinated. The sense of order is also prompted by the presence of a leader of 
the Whanganui iwi who, holding a ceremonial walking stick (Tokotoko), leads and to some 
extent conducts the proceedings. Edmund Leach might have been correct in his generalisation 
that in “ordinary culturally defined ritual performance”: 
 
 
28 Werry, ibid., 14.  
29 M. McLean, Weavers of Song: Polynesian Music and Dance (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1995). 
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The proceedings follow an ordered pattern which has been established by tradition – 
“this is our custom”. There is usually a “conductor”, a master of ceremonies, a chief 
priest, a central protagonist, whose actions provide the temporal markers for everyone 
else. But there is no separate audience of listeners. The performers and the listeners 
are the same people.30 
 
“Conduct” is a concept that connects powerfully the lives of law and music and rivers. The 
ducal nature of legal authority meets the musical conductor meets the duct or conduit by 
which to greater or lesser degree most human civilisations throughout history have sought to 
contain, control and divert the life of rivers. How accurate it is to think of the holder of the 
Tokotoko as a conductor of the waiata it is hard to say, but Leach’s observation purports to 
have general application to culturally defined ritual performance whatever the context. It 
might, for instance, apply as well to the culturally defined ritual performances of the United 
Kingdom parliament as to that of any Māori iwi. There, Her Majesty The Queen might be 
considered to be, in ceremonial terms so far as law-making is concerned, the “conductor” and 
“central protagonist” of all business conducted in Parliament; she is even, as the titular Head 
of the Church of England, the nation’s “chief priest”. It just happens that Her Majesty, being 
seldom present in Parliament in her bodily person, is instead represented there through the 
physical medium of her ministers. In the chambers of the House of Commons and House of 
Lords, Her Majesty’s authority is also represented materially through the presence of The 
Mace, one for each chamber. The Mace is ceremonially brought into the chamber whenever it 
 
30 E. Leach, Culture and Communication: The Logic by Which Symbols are Connected 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 45. 
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is to sit in legislative session, and if The Mace is not present in the chamber, the House has 
no power to make laws. The representative nature of The Mace is most obvious during the 
State Opening of Parliament, for on that occasion the Monarch is present in person with the 
Imperial State Crown and the Mace is not present because it is not needed when the Monarch 
is bodily present. However much The Mace resembles the Māori Tokotoko as a material 
representation of the conductor’s authority, as Leach terms it, one key distinction is that The 
Mace represents Her Majesty’s authority substitutionally, whereas the Tokotoko, held in the 
leader’s hand, does so conjunctively. 
Joanne Kowhai Hayes, of the Ngāti Porou (a Māori iwi) is a Member of Parliament 
for the New Zealand National Party. On the occasion of the Third Reading, she invited the 
members of Parliament to approach the river: 
 
I just say for the people in this House here, our members of Parliament, if ever you 
get a chance to be able to cross the Whanganui River, at any point of its journey from 
Hinengakau all the way down through to Tūpoho, and if you sit and you stop and you 
listen, I am sure that you will hear the voices of our tūpuna as they are singing that 
wonderful waiata that I have fallen in love with. The words are: [she sings] e rere Te 
Awa Tupua [“flow the Ancestral River”]. And, with that, Mr Speaker, I commend the 
bill to the House. Congratulations. Kia ora.31  
To cross the river in a canoe (waka) and stop at the midpoint where it is deepest and listen 
there to the voices of the ancestors (tūpuna) joins the iwi to the river and the river to song. 
There is even a sense in which the river is a sort of law of life, for “While the river iwi do not 




River owns them, obligating them to care for the river and protect its intrinsic interests”.32 Te 
Awa Tupua is understood therefore to be not only a physical river, but a people, a song, a 
lore, and even a law. In long, a whole articulation of life. 
 
Part Two: Making Music 
Appreciating music in this way not only makes musical sense of sound but in so doing also 
constitutes performer and perceiver as co-producers in the process of making music. 
Jerome Frank is one of a number of scholars who have written about the role of judge 
and jury in interpreting and thereby fulfilling the legislative intentions of parliament in 
something like the way that conductors and instrumentalists interpret and fulfil the musical 
work of a composer. Important as that insight is, in this article I will endeavour to limit my 
attention to activity within the legislative forum itself. Furthermore, whereas I agree with 
Frank that: 
the conscientious, intelligent judge will consider government a sort of orchestra, in 
which, in symphonies authorized by the people, the courts and the legislature each 
play their parts.33  
 
And with Daniel J. Kornstein, who said that “Judges and lawyers are performers of legal 
music” (he was referring to “the continuing fundamental debate in constitutional law over 
original intent versus a living document”),34 the hope is that we can go further than this in 
 
32 https://sites.google.com/site/whanganuiriverrights/the-river-as-a-legal-entity. 
33 J. Frank, “Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation” (1947) 47(8) 
Columbia Law Review 1259, 1272. 
34 D. J. Kornstein, “Introductory Remarks: Panel on Politics” (1999) 20 Cardozo L Rev 
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imagining the public as performers and co-producers of the legislative music when they are 
neither professional lawyers nor people who have been co-opted to legal officialdom through 
jury service. What I have in mind is the influence at the legislative or compositional stage 
that comes from the wider constituency of people implicated in and affected by law-making. 
There is a great deal of truth in the observation made by J M Balkin and Sanford Levinson, 
that: 
Like other performing arts, legal performance is more than the interpretation of a text 
by a performer: it involves a triangle of reciprocal influences between the creators of 
texts, the performers of texts, and the audiences affected by those performances.35 
 
It is nevertheless important that the influence of the audience be not postponed or relegated to 
the post-production stage of the law-making process. It is all too easy to suppose that the 
official legislature and legal profession have a monopoly over law-making. If one defines law 
narrowly enough it is clear that such agencies will by definition have a monopoly, but the 
narrow definitions that produce such an outcome are the work of the jurists’ profession in all 
its practising and academic branches and as such are somewhat self-serving and self-defining. 
Crucially, Balkin and Levinson go on to state that members of the audience are not merely 
passive, but also: 
 
1331, 1332. 
35 J. M. Balkin and S. Levinson, “Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on 




play an important although often unacknowledged role in creating the conditions for 
authentic or faithful performance. Performances exist in traditions and institutions of 
performance that set standards for what kinds of performances are judged faithful or 
authentic. Judgments about faithfulness and authenticity, in turn, occur against the 
backdrop of the many different communities that help shape the tradition, including 
the audience of fellow performers and laypersons. Standards of faithful or authentic 
performance are social and evolve over time. They result from negotiation and 
struggle between performers and these various audiences. This is no less true in law 
than in music and drama.36 
 
Claude Lévi-Strauss said something along these lines, in his inimitably grand and quotable 
style, when he opined that “myth and musical work are like conductors of an orchestra, 
whose listeners are silent performers”.37 The point is that audiences in the triangular relation 
outlined by Balkin and Levinson influence the performance of others and constitute the 
performance of others as authoritative, so that the audience is in a sense a co-producer of the 
law constituted by the performance. Public approval, even if it merely takes the form of 
applause, is in a constitutive sense a part of the action. To put it in terms of legal 
performance, the applause seals the deed and is therefore an active part of the execution of 
the deed – hence the word “exécutants” employed by Lévi-Strauss is perfectly apposite. The 
public audience is integral to the law-making process at least to the extent that its approval is 
 
36 Balkin and Levinson, “Interpreting”, 1519-20. 
37 “Le mythe et l’œuvre musicale apparaissent ainsi comme des chefs d’orchestre dont les 
auditeurs sont les silencieux exécutants” (my translation) (Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques, 
volume. I: Le Cru et le Cuit (Paris: Plon, 1964), 25. 
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appealed to, or is (through political mandate) retroactively woven back into, the stages of 
parliamentary law making. Furthermore, and beyond this minimal version of the public’s 
participation, there are occasions in which a wider public or communal presence fractures the 
usual formalities and shows itself in the forum itself. The waiata of the Whanganui iwi, 
performed on the occasion of the Third Reading, was a paradigmatic occasion. Critical and 
creative interventions of a very different sort have even been witnessed in the Chamber of the 
House of Commons of the Palace of Westminster. In the public gallery there have been 
orchestrated protests, including, recently, protests by women campaigning against raises to 
the age at which women become eligible for a state pension and semi-naked protests by 
climate change activists. On the floor of the chamber itself, MPs have performed 
interventions ranging from the more reverent (for example, the singing of hymns and political 
anthems)38 to the decidedly irreverent (for example, Dennis Skinner MP’s habitual heckling 
of the parliamentary official known as “Black Rod”).39 Those examples were more or less 
mischievous, and certainly unauthorised, interventions by opposition MPs performed during 
an active parliamentary session. A very different contribution, also instigated by an 
Opposition MP, came when the House was not in session in the form of chamber music 
performed in the Chamber of the House of Commons by the string quartet “The Statutory 
Instruments”.40 That performance was authorised by The Speaker of the House of Commons. 
Even this author once had the privilege of performing in the Palace of Westminster; not in the 
Chamber of the House of Commons, but in Westminster Hall. The choral society to which I 
 
38 “‘Scuffles’ in the Commons as Parliament is prorogued for five weeks” (Metro 10  
September 2019). 
39 “Labour MP Dennis Skinner heckles Black Rod” (The Guardian, 14 Oct 2019). 
40 www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/bristol-mp-explains-new-music-3141935. 
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belong had been invited to sing alongside the Parliament Choir.41 It was the first public 
concert ever held in Westminster Hall, and as a jurist I felt privileged to perform alongside 
members of the legislature in the very place that for seven hundred years had been home to 
the nation’s central courts of judicature. I experienced the occasion as an outsider, albeit for a 
moment from the inside of the legally sacred space. It is, one suspects, the sort of space in 
which one is always an outsider, even on the inside.  
 It is as outsiders that we, being members of the general public, are aware of 
performance in the chambers of the United Kingdom and New Zealand parliaments. Our 
experience is mediated – bridged and articulated –  by means of social and mainstream 
media. These media create an (if it isn’t tautologous to say so) immediacy between orator and 
the public audience that has scarcely been achieved since the days of open-air oratory in the 
Roman forum. Kamila Wysłucha  makes the point that in classical Rome “the most 
significant moment for a musician or an orator was a public presentation of their art”.42 
Emphasising the constitutive power of public participation, she adds that in a passage of De 
oratore (II.83), Cicero stresses that neither music nor oratory could exist without a public 
performance.43 What Cicero had in mind is performance to the public and approval by the 
audience. Where (as in the waiata on the occasion of the Third Reading) public performance 
entails performance by the audience, not merely in the form of performed approval but also 
by virtue of new invention and new creation, its constitutive power as part of the law-making 
process is even more potent. 
 
41 See www.parliamentchoir.org.uk. 
42 K. Wysłucha, “Motif of comparison : oratory and music in rhetorical works of Cicero and 
Quintilian” (2010) 15.2 Graeco-Latina Brunensia 171-180, 175. 
43 Ibid., 177. 
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I commenced this essay with the observation that music is a way of appreciating 
sound. The opera or work done in any musical appreciation of sound is done in part by the 
instigator of the sound and in part by the person who hears and responds. (The same 
individual can of course play both roles). Music is, I would suggest, in essence a metaphor 
for a peculiarly human way of appreciating sound, in the sense that the arts of music 
(performative and interpretative) translate sounds into forms that can be appreciated as being 
organised according to a certain system of ordering.  If it is the case that the sense we 
attribute to sounds when we call them music is a sense of order and rhythmic regulation, the 
interpretative appreciation of sound that leads to the assessment “this is music” can be 
considered to be a mode of law-making. The individual hearer performs a sort of legislative 
listening, a “law making music”, every time they attribute musical meaning to acoustic 
events.  
Bret Rappaport writes that: “The neurological mechanisms that operate to perceive 
and be influenced by music are the same ones (or many of the same ones) that operate in the 
brain for language-first spoken and then written”.44 This is not quoted in order to suggest that 
words, still less written text, can (or should be enabled to) capture musical sense, but only to 
show that cognitive processes of ascribing abstract meaning to concrete stimuli are 
essentially metaphoric whether the language in which they work is musical, literary or legal. 
Metaphor, which typically operates poetically to connect an abstract concept to a concrete 
sense (Robert Burns’ phrase “my Luve’s like a red, red rose” exemplifies the point) is a two-
way bridge or ferry (the old-fashioned “chain ferry” may be the ideal metaphor for metaphor, 
 
44 B. Rappaport, “Using the Elements of Rhythm, Flow, and Tone to Create a More 
Effective and Persuasive Acoustic Experience in Legal Writing” (2010) 16 Legal Writing: J 
Legal Writing Inst. 65-116, 68. 
 24 
for it moves even as it connects both sides) that simultaneously connects the tenor concept 
(for example, “love”) with the concrete vehicle (for example, “red, red rose”). In the poetical 
works of Robert Burns, the bridge or ferry is wrought out of words, but metaphor can operate 
with equal meaning and emotive effect in the form of music or dance. Bret Rappaport cites a 
2004 article by Michael Vincent entitled “The Language of Music, the Music of Language, 
More Than a Metaphor”, which, to judge by its title, suggests that Vincent employs too 
limited a conception of metaphor.45 Properly understood, metaphor is not merely descriptive 
of a deeper reality, but is the very means by which our conception of reality is constructed. 
To have a full conception of the work of metaphor in words and sounds, one does not need 
“more than metaphor”; one needs only to understand metaphor more. Henry Peacham 
regarded music as a form of rhetoric, saying that “no rhetoric more persuadeth or hath greater 
power over the mind”.46 Music’s rhetorical attributes are to be found in the use of such 
formal figures as gradation, amplification, antithesis, repetition, chiasmus, metonymy, 
ellipsis, parallelism and so forth. There is though, overarching such particulars, a general 
sense that music is rhetorical because it moves forms and translates modes of life in the way 
that metaphor does; and music, like metaphor, is deemed to be successful in its performance 
when it pleases the hearer. We too often think of metaphor in relation to the particular simile. 
This is to think of metaphor as “a” metaphor. What we need to do is to think about what 
metaphor, in general, does. This is to think of metaphor as a dynamic activity; a way of 
working and of making meaning. The author of Wordless Rhetoric puts it well in a section on 
 
45 It would be inappropriate to reach a final judgment, given that I have been unable to locate 
the text of Vincent’s article. 
46 Henry Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman (1622), V. B. Heltzel ed., (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), 115-16.  
 25 
“Musical Form and Metaphor”, when he writes that, when considering the relationship 
between rhetoric, music and languages, “[r]ather than limit ourselves to examining what 
‘literal’ meanings metaphors express, we should broaden our inquiry to include what 
conceptions a metaphor implies”.47 Thought of in this way, we discover a dynamic idea that 
goes to the very root of what music and rhetoric both aim at, which is “movement”. Music is 
able to move because it is formed, in its essential materials and structures, from movements 
of parts within a whole. Metaphor by the same token translates or moves from one formal 
state to another, the word “translatio” – meaning “across-carry” – being the direct Latin 
equivalent of the Greek “metaphora” (think “meta-ferry”). 
There is an old and ongoing debate in musicology between those who favour a pure 
form of musical appreciation in which attention is restricted to music as music, and those  
who allow that music may be appreciated by ascribing non-musical or extra-musical 
meanings to what is heard. As we consider this distinction it will be helpful to think of it as 
being also a way of distinguishing approaches to law: on one side the extreme positivist 
attitude that regards law as a formal system of rules that is as legally proper as it is internally 
consistent, and, on the other side, critical appreciation of law according to its moral, ethical, 
cultural, social and personal implications. The latter sorts of approach depend upon 
imaginative articulation between law and life and therefore open the way to appreciate that 
the waiata performed on the occasion of the Third Reading played a part in the productive or 
output stage of the law-making process. 
 
47 M. E. Bonds, Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), “Introduction” pp.7-8. 
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Peter Kivy exemplifies the distinction between types of musical appreciation with the 
assistance a passage that opens Chapter 5 of E. M. Forster’s novel Howards End, and which 
provides the epigraph and theme for Kivy’s book: 
 
It will be generally admitted that Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is the most sublime 
noise that has ever penetrated into the ear of man.  All sorts and conditions are 
satisfied by it. Whether you are like Mrs. Munt, and tap surreptitiously when the tunes 
come – of course, not so as to disturb the others – or like Helen, who can see heroes 
and shipwrecks in the music’s flood; or like Margaret, who can only see the music; or 
like Tibby, who is profoundly versed in counterpoint, and holds the full score open on 
his knee; or like their cousin, Fraulein Mosebach, who remembers all the time that 
Beethoven is “echt Deutsch” … the passion of your life becomes more vivid, and you 
are bound to admit that such a noise is cheap at two shillings.48 
 
Kivy seizes in particular upon the contrast between Helen Schlegel who, as she listens, “can 
see heroes and shipwrecks in the music’s flood”, and her brother Tibby Schlegel, who “is 
profoundly versed in counterpoint, and holds the full score open on his knee”.49 Kivy argues 
that Tibby savours “tönend bewegte Formen”, a German phrase that might be translated 
“tonally moving forms” or “sounding mobile forms”. The phrase is taken from Eduard 
 
48 E.M.Forster, Howards End (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), ch. 5. 
49 P. Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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Hanslick’s assertion that the beauty of music resides in “tönend bewegte Formen”.50 In their 
article “Impurely Musical Make-Believe”, Eran Guter and Inbal Guter write that: 
 
For Kivy, an eminent advocate of formalism, this sharp contrast between Helen-type 
listening and Tibby-type listening ultimately means that Helen cannot really be a pure 
listener “of the work”.51 
 
The Guters rebut Kivy’s analysis (or rebut Kivy’s presumption that pure listening is a virtue), 
arguing that: 
 
In contradistinction to formalism and to persona-theory narrativism, the ultimate point 
of impurely musical make-believe may be to enable us to appreciate how music 
meshes with our lives.52 
 
I would agree with that rebuttal, and so too might Margaret Schlegel. Forster appears to 
locate her somewhere between the formalism of her brother Tibby and the romantism of her 
sister Helen. On the formalist side, Forster tells us that Margaret “can only see the music”, 
whereas on the romantic side, it is to Margaret that Forster gives the novel’s central message:  
 
 
50 Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst (1854). 
51 E. Guter and I. Guter, “Impurely Musical Make-Believe” in Bareis and Nordrum eds.  
How to Make Believe: The Fictional Truths of the Representational Arts (Berlin/Boston: De 
Gruyter Berlin/Boston, 2015) 283-307, 284. 
52 Ibid., 304: 
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Only connect!  That was the whole of her sermon.  Only connect the prose and the 
passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height.  Live in 
fragments no longer.53 
 
Christian Morar gives an account of Margaret’s “sermon” that expresses very well the sense 
of articulation that I have been urging, namely a joining of parts that does not dissolve their 
distinctiveness as parts but enhances and expresses it more completely through the very act of 
composing the whole. He writes that: 
 
Margaret’s “Live in fragments no longer” injunction recognizes the fragment with all 
that it implies and thus points to a form of sociality – rather than a firm social 
synthesis – in which fragments, individuals, and cultural models link up and support 
one another mindful of each other’s incompleteness and distinctiveness.54 
 
We know from manuscript notes that Forster’s choice of the name Schlegel was expressly 
made with an unnamed “critic” – possibly Friedrich Schlegel – in mind.55 The choice seems 
 
53 Forster, Howards End, ch. 22. 
54 C. Morar, “The Forster Connection or, Cosmopolitanism Redux: Zadie Smith’s On Beauty, 
Howards End, and the Schlegels.” The Comparatist 35 (May 2011): 133-147. 
55 J. Hillis Miller points out that the choice of Schlegel is not accidental, citing an early 
manuscript version of the novel in which appears the phrase: “Their father, a distant relation 
of the critic” (“Just Reading Howards End” in Howards End. A. M. Duckworth (ed) (Boston: 
Bedford Books, 1997) 467-82, 474). See, further, L. White, “Vital Disconnection in Howards 
End” (2005) 51(1) Twentieth Century Literature 43-63. 
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to allude to Schlegel’s notion of the free-standing (that is word-independent) nature of the 
musical idea. As Schlegel writes: “Must not purely instrumental music create its own 
text?”.56 Mark Evan Bonds informs us that the German jurist Wackenroder also stressed  “the 
self-referential quality of instrumental music in chiding those who would provide a program 
for every untexted composition”.57 Wackenroder had asked “Do they strive to measure the 
richer language by means of the weaker and solve with words that which disdains words?”.58 
Bonds also refers to the music criticism of the jurist Ε. T. A. Hoffmann, noting that “One of 
the basic premises of Hoffmann’s music criticism is his distinction between the rational and 
irrational elements of music, which he associates with the qualities of Besonnenheit 
(“awareness / prudence”) and Genie (“genius”), respectively”:59  
 
Besonnenheit emphasizes the objective side of art, the process by which the creator 
distances himself from his creation and exercises criticism upon it. For Hoffmann, the 
perspective of this objective process is that of the composer’s intended audience.60 
 
 
56 F. Schlegel, “Athenäums-Fragment 444” in Hans Eichner (ed), Kritische Friedrich-
Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol. 2 (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), 254. 
57 Wordless Rhetoric, n.40 above, 176: “Rhetoric and the Autonomy of Instrumental Music”. 
58 W. H. Wackenroder, “Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst und die Seelenlehre 
der heutigen Instrumentalmusik” (orig. pub. 1799), in G. Heinrich (ed) Wilhelm Heinrich 
Wackenroder: Werke und Briefe (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1984), 326. 
59 Wordless Rhetoric, n.40 above, 177. 
60 Ibid., 178. 
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Whilst I echo the Guters’ preference for musical appreciation that imaginatively and 
linguistically meshes sounds to lived context, I would argue that the Tibby and the Margaret 
and the Helen modes of ascribing meaning to music – ranging from the purest form of 
ascribing meaning to the music qua music to the ascription of musical meaning by relating 
the music to a wider context – can all be considered in various ways to be participatory 
modes of making music by producing a musical sense of the sound. On this view, the Guters’ 
idea of “musical make-believe” is not limited to the contextualization process by which 
sound is imaginatively synthesized to its linguistic, scenic and cultural context, but includes 
any cognitive process by which the listener participates in the process of attributing sense to 
sound. Music must certainly be appreciated as music without deference to accompanying or 
interpretative words, but to seek to isolate music from its wider cultural and cognitive 
connections does not enhance the status of music as music but seriously diminishes it. After 
all, the very name of music denotes its imagined place in a mythological scheme. The 
challenge is to appreciate the music as music and in context. Lawyers will be familiar with 
this challenge as one that resembles the equitable endeavour to respect a general rule of law 
whilst adapting it to the materials of life as the context of a case presents them. In contrast to 
the equitable law maker, whether judicial or legislative, is the legal stickler who supposes 
that their interpretation must adhere unwauveringly to an invariable authorial intention. It is 
with this legal stickler and their musical equivalent in mind, that Jerome Frank write 
approvingly of the composer and musicologist Ernst Křenek (1900-1991) who: 
 
criticizes those musical “purists” who insist on what they call “work-fidelity”. The 
performer of a musical piece – an individual pianist, violinist, or an orchestra-leader-
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should, say the purists, engage in “authentic interpretation” which eliminates the 
interpreter altogether.61 
 
Frank also mentions that another composer and author, Charles Darnton (1905-1981), wrote 
that it “makes nonsense of the music to play it as if the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth reside in the notes and [the composer’s] directions”, for the performance should vary 
“with the musical insight and interpretative skill of the interpreter”.62 Important for present 
purposes is that fact that it is not merely at the judicial stage that the challenge of contextual 
(“equitable”) appreciation and adaptation presents itself, for it is also present at the 
compositional or legislative stage. At that prior stage, it is incumbent upon the composer in 
the very act of drafting to have past and future interpretative possibilities always in mind. In 
something like this manner, Hoffmann’s idea of Besonnenheit (mentioned earlier) supposes 
that the primary performer notionally stands back from their own invention to imagine its 
critical reception in the mind of a disinterested listener. This process of imaginative 
distancing entails a highly pragmatic mental exercise, but it is also an ethical exercise that 
demonstrates the composer’s humility in admitting the imagined audience as co-producer of 
the musical output. 
 
61 “Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation” (1947) 47(8) Columbia 
Law Review 1259, 1260. Referring to Křenek’s book Music Here and Now (New York : 
Norton, 1939) and “The Composer and the Interpreter” The composer and the interpreter, an 
address given at Black Mountain College, 4 September 1944 (3 Black Mountain College 
Bulletin 1944). 
62 Ibid., at 1261. (The quotations are from C. Darnton, You and Music (Harmondsworth: 
Pelican, 1945) 161-62, 40. 
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 The imaginative exercise in legislative activity, through which strict law is 
extrapolated out into a wider range of expressive possibilities, resembles in some respects 
Heinrich Schenker’s notion of Auskomponierung (“Composing Out”) as an aspect of Der 
freie Satz (“Free Composition”). Wayne Alpern writes that: 
 
Composing out is the paradigmatic act of synthesis (Synthese) between order and 
freedom in music. It subsumes all of the connective devices such as arpeggiation, 
passing tone progressions, neighbor note motions, voice exchanges, motions to and 
from and inner voice, superposition, register transfer, and octave coupling-all of 
which “bind together” (Verbindung) the intervening tension spans between the 
periodic points of organizational stability just like the “composing out” of the triad 
into the fundamental line. The objective of composing out is to arbitrate a 
compositional compromise between unbridled artistic freedom and the constraints of 
musical structure, both of which are essential. …63 
 
This talk of connective devices binding elements together into a synthetic whole would seem 
to support my argument that musical composition operates in the same articulating, 
metaphorical and equitable mode in which laws are made. Where the statute falls short in its 
imagination, the task of free composition passes to the judges. Their role is to fill the gaps, 
not only by way of joining together (harmonizing) the “fragmentary” statute,64 but also by 
 
63 “Music Theory as a Mode of Law: The Case of Heinrich Schenker, Esq.” (1999) 20 
Cardozo L Rev 1459-1512, 1491. 
64 B. N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1921) 16. 
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joining the statute to society. Justice Cardozo put it this way, in terms which (whilst expressly 
mindful of the French juristic notion of “libre recherche scientifique”) will for us be 
reminiscent of the musical notion of free composition:  
 
The judge as the interpreter for the community of its sense of law and order must 
supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize results with justice through a 
method of free decision.65 
 
Part Three: Music as Articulation 
Proceeding from the idea that music operates as metaphor and, like all metaphor, produces 
meaning by translating abstractions into concrete conceptions, this part posits music as a 
bridge – a joint or articulation – between eras, cultures and social strata that might otherwise 
struggle to find meaningful points of contact and communication. Key to this idea of music 
as articulation is the expectation that thinking musically and metaphorically is the best way to 
imagine and realise harmonious relations between distinct and diverse places and people.  
The work of making music is in that respect akin to the work of making law. John Snape cites 
Isaiah Berlin for the view that: 
 
Legislation is not the making of laws (that would be more properly called 
“legisfaction”). Legislation is the translation into legal terms of something which is to 
be found in nature: ends, purposes.66 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 I. Berlin, Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty H Hardy (ed) (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 2002), 15. (Cited in J. Snape, “David Hume: Philosophical Historian of 
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I do not agree with the stark distinction that Berlin draws between “making” and 
“translation”. The process of translation is a highly creative way of producing something new 
from existing materials; the legislature is certainly a law-making body. Nevertheless, what 
Berlin very helpfully alerts us to is the possibility that the legislature makes law in a 
metaphoric or translatory mode; forming a bridge as it were between human nature and 
human law. Berlin emphasizes in italics the “lation” that connects legislation and translation, 
and it is worthwhile pausing on that choice, The root “latus” is employed in Latin to denote 
carrying, but how it came into existence, given the dominance of the verb “ferre” (“to bear”), 
is something of an etymological mystery. The best estimate is Calvert Watkins’ suggestion 
that it derives from the Proto-Indo-European root *telə- “to bear”.67 We can speculate, 
therefore, that “latus” was itself, at some point in its history, a metaphoric translation; an 
imaginative leap from one line to another in something like the way that the English “went” 
(from “to wend”) became the past participle of the otherwise unrelated verb “to go”. This is 
mentioned because, without an inherent sense of translation, the element “latus” does not 
serve the point that Berlin is making. What Berlin is really concerned with is not the “lation”, 
but the “trans”. It is the crossing over from nature to law that really makes his point of 
comparison between legislation and translation, and (subject to the etymological quibble) it is 
an excellent point to make. It offers a very helpful way to think about the metaphoric activity 
 
Tax Law” in P. Harris and D. De Cogan eds., Studies in the History of Tax Law 7 (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015) 421-464, 460). 
67 C. Watkins ed., The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 2nd edn., 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000). 
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through which law-making and music-making express the raw material of natural life in 
terms of an integrated regulatory order. 
Bearing in mind this idea of translation-as-making and making-as-translation, the way 
is open to explore the imaginative and metaphoric making processes that operate in music 
and law; and to consider what they might promise in terms of positive relations between, in 
our example, a river and a people. Here I have an echo in my memory of James Boyd 
White’s Justice as Translation, where he writes that for him “the fundamental image of life 
is…composition: people seeking to make texts that will establish meanings and relations with 
others”.68 Let us therefore dwell a while upon the process of composition. I will do this in 
two stages. First, I will consider the process by which the very idea or code or law of music is 
created out of found sound, that is out of sound that is naturally occurring. Second, I will 
consider the process of composition by which parts are combined into a particular piece of 
music to produce a whole that is harmonious. Both stages involve processes of joining or 
articulation. Music is frequently considered holistically in terms of its “texture”, and “text” is 
the subject of composition in the preceding quote from White. To express the two stages of 
making in terms of the material production of textile, we might say that the first stage 
involves the process of forming a yarn from natural fibres (spinning is one way), and that the 
second stage involves the integration of yarns into a textile (weaving is one way). What I 
hope will emerge as we think through these two stages of making, is a new way of 
appreciating music, law, and the lore of the River. We will find that the law-making process, 
even in a parliamentary place of speaking, is a creative process that starts with found 
elements of natural, social and cultural life and fabricates them into forms that maintain a 
 
68 J. B. White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990) 20. 
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constant expressive connection – a constantly moving articulation – between public source 
and parliamentary mouth. 
For the first stage of making, I will begin by turning to Dorothy L Sayers. Her 
monograph The Mind of the Maker,69 commences with a chapter on “The ‘Laws’ of Nature 
and Opinion” in which she proposes a fundamental distinction between law as a “generalised 
statement of observed fact” (in which she includes most of the so called “laws of nature”), 
and, on the other hand, law as: 
 
an arbitrary regulation made by human consent in particular circumstances for a 
particular purpose, and capable of being promulgated, enforced, suspended, altered or 
rescinded without interference with the general scheme of the universe.70 
 
Expressing this distinction in terms of the sport of cricket, she posits as an example of the 
former type of law, the fact that the ball struck into the air must come back to earth; and, as 
an example of the latter, the rules (they are actually known as “Laws”) of the sport as 
promulgated and maintained by the sport’s legislative body, the MCC (Marylebone Cricket 
Club). What does Sayers’ distinction between the immutable-natural and the arbitrary-
artificial look like when we turn to music? At first sight it fits nicely. We might say that there 
is a natural or found law in the resonant sound of wind blowing on fibre or wood, and that 
artificial and arbitrary law is present in the articulation by humans of a musical order by 
arranging the natural sound spectrum into tonal and temporal elements – say by measuring a 
natural fibre to a certain length and regulating it into resonant intervals by means of fingers or 
 
69 D. L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1941). 
70 Ibid., 2. 
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frets and then strumming it rhythmically. Yet, on further reflection, we find that natural 
sound is not so immutable as it might at first appear, and neither is musical regulation so 
arbitrary. The natural sound of wind on wood is not as pure a law as Sayers’ example of the 
law of gravity. If I jump off a high building, I will fall no matter what I make of it. There is 
no imaginative translation or metaphoric engagement that will keep me suspended in the air. 
The stage of finding sound in nature is not independent of human perception. When nature 
produces soundwaves, they are perfectly silent vibrations in the air. They only become sound 
at the point of perception by a sentient receiver. Defining sound in that way provides this 
answer to an old philosophical riddle: when a tree falls in a forest devoid of sentient life, it 
does not make a sound. The production of sound is the work of an audience. An acoustic 
stimulus can be misinterpreted or creatively interpreted at a point on its journey from ear to 
brain and the interpretation will produce a new thing. If I jump from a high building, gravity 
produces the same thing no matter how I interpret it. Any creative interpretation I might add 
to the physically inevitable outcomes will be merely that – an interpretation of an event – it 
will not fundamentally change the nature of the event in the way that reception and 
interpretation of sound does. This is so because in the case of sound stimuli there is no 
audible outcome at all in the absence of a receiver capable of perceiving it and (if only in a 
basic – perhaps instinctual – way) of interpreting it. 
At the second stage, which is the artificial imposition of musical order, we find that 
the process of making musical rules is not as arbitrary as the process of making rules for 
sport. It is perhaps for this reason that Sayers does not dwell on the example of music. The 
rules of cricket can be changed in any particular respect, provided that they work together 
with sufficient integrity and practicality. Humans have power to change the laws of the game 
at will, provided only (and Sayers makes this point) that the rules do not require what is 
naturally impossible – for example that the ball should be struck into the air and remain there. 
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The potentially endless proliferation and variety of sports is evidence of the fact that given 
certain starting materials – nothing more perhaps than a stone and a stick – the human will to 
devise different rules for dealing with the basic elemental materials is theoretically endless. Is 
it the same with music? It may only be different in a matter of degree, but it is certainly not 
the same. Music, or that which the performing and audient community agrees to call music, 
must be more than found sound. The sound of a waterfall can be very pleasing (it can in other 
circumstances be terrifying), but the sound does not become music until the audience has 
regulated it – usually by at least perceiving a pattern of pitch and rhythm in it. Music is 
mused – it is always ultimately inspired by and connected to something beyond the human 
will – but it is human will that creates and produces music out of the seed of a sound. In 
Plato’s Laws we read that: 
 
Now, whereas all other creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of 
order and disorder in movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to men the 
very gods…have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby 
they cause us to move and lead our choirs, linking us one with another by means of 
songs and dances; and to the choir they have given its name from the “cheer” [chara] 
implanted therein.71 
 
Music is formed as such in the human senses, but its formation is subject to the physical 
conditions of the natural world. No arbitrary power of human will can free us from the 
physical fact that the resonant frequency of a string fixed at both ends and held in constant 
 
71 Plato, Laws R. G. Bury trans. Loeb Classical Library 192 [Plato vol. XI] (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1926) vol II, Books 7-12, 653d–654a. 
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tension is heightened by a certain ratio when the length of the string is halved. When we 
agree that something is or is not music (leaving aside any personal judgment as to its being 
“good” or “bad” music) we make our assessment not out of unencumbered free will, but 
within the parameters of the physical world to which the human sense of hearing has become 
attuned. The determination that a sound is musical is accordingly not a wholly arbitrary 
matter of taste, but a matter of taste exercised within the parameters of physical and 
biological tolerances. A postmodern musicologist might dispute this and say that found sound 
in the form of arrhythmic and unpitched noise can be music if the hearer thinks it so. So be it, 
there is no way of disputing such an opinion, but such theorists cannot escape three things. 
First, that their own interpretative imagination has to work very hard to make music out of 
sound when it offers none of the standard incidents of musical form. If this sort of articulation 
were an elbow, it would be overworked and very painful. Such a human relation to natural 
sound might create a certain dissonant and difficult form of harmony, but it would lack 
euphony – which is the important biological and social quality of being pleasing to the ear. 
Second, whereas sound that doesn’t positively please is one thing, sound that is inaudible or 
painful to the human ear can only be called music if we strip from music all sense of human 
engagement with the phenomenon. We might as well apply the name of “food” to any edible 
substance no matter how unpalatable and lacking in nutritional value.  Third, human 
communities will generally disagree with an unconstrained postmodern notion of music as 
anything we choose to make of any sound. Pure random found sound – noise – that lacks the 
qualities of musical order will therefore lack the very aspect that make music such an 
important part of human life, namely its capacity to unite us within a civil and cultural sense 
of lives lived in harmony with each other and with the natural world. 
Any suggestion that music is entirely and nothing more than that which humans 
choose to make of sound would, in any case, be anthropocentric and lacking in humility. It 
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would ignore the fact that the biological make-up of the human ear and brain as a system of 
hearing is itself produced by, and is an integral part of, the very sound-producing world that 
an extreme postmodern theory might suppose can become a dispassionately disconnected 
object of human critique. Writing with something like this in mind, Sayers contrasts the 
“human maker” who “tortures his material” so that “the stone looks unhappy when he has 
wrought it into a pattern alien to its own nature…his writing is an abuse of language, his 
music a succession of unmeaning intervals”, to the maker who “respects and interprets the 
integrity of his material” and who “works with plants, with animals or with men” so that “the 
co-operative will of the material takes part in the work”. She prefers the latter, but says that 
the ideal is ultimately unattainable, because the human artist is “part of his own material”. 72 
 With all this talk, we might be forgetting the experience of witnessing the waiata 
performed on the occasion of the Third Reading in the New Zealand parliament. Recalling 
that outsiders were invited to approach the river and to cross it and to pause to listen for its 
song, let us consider what the metaphorical appreciation of music as a bridge – or a chain 
ferry or a canoe (waka) - might mean for our understanding of law as a bridge between 
human society and the natural world.73 As we do so, we should bear constantly in mind the 
 
72 Sayers, Mind, 114-5. 
73 With the canoe in mind, I commend to the reader James Tully’s Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
The cover image of the book is a detail from the wonderful sculpture The Spirit of Haida 
Gwaii, by Bill Reid, a master carver of the indigenous Haida people of Canada’s west coast. 
The sculpture depicts. Tully praises it for its “dialogical capacity for diversity awareness” and 
in particular for the lessons that can be learned from the fact that the inhabitants of the canoe 
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two stages by which music is made – the first being the ordering of sound into a system in 
response to, and in responsible relation to, naturally occurring impulses; the second being the 
harmonious synthesis of a particular musical composition out of diverse musical elements. 
Harmony between humans, and between humans and nature, is the hope. My argument is that 
metaphoric imagination is the way to achieve this, and that musical thinking is especially 
helpful to this imaginative process because music is itself made of metaphor. Crucially, so 
too is the law. We could be drawn here into the old debate between positivist and natural law 
jurisprudence, but that should perhaps wait for another time and place. As a preliminary 
provocation I would suggest only this – that law has in common with music the fact that 
neither is wholly natural nor wholly arbitrary; and that both operate by maintaining a 
connection between the found systems of nature (including the eco-system and human nature 
in all its socialised and acculturated shapes), and a more or less arbitrary and abstract system 
of rules.74 Most of the fundamentals of law – agreements, property and wrongs – have their 
source in innate features of human society and psychology. Law making, including the 
positing of rules, does not occur in a vacuum, but describes the processes of making a 
complex ordered system out of those basic naturally (including socially) occurring features of 
human life. If we can get a feel for the metaphorical workings that make music out of sound, 
and which articulate humanity to the rest of the natural world, we might also have the means 
to produce harmony between different cultural, spiritual and systemic conceptions of law. 
 
“make up an association more akin to the irregular arrangement of an ancient, custom-based 
constitution than to a modern, uniform constitutional association” (p. 26). 
74 This is similar to the point made by Isaiah Berlin in the quotation cited at n.63 above. 
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It will be illuminating at this point to turn to Hanne Petersen’s rich article “Peripheral 
Perspectives on Musical Orders”.75 After a survey of nations in which indigenous law and 
culture is entwined with music, Petersen throws down a musically inspired challenge to law: 
 
I believe that we need a concept and an understanding of order that moves far beyond 
both legal positivism and legal pluralism. We need an understanding that is much 
more sensitive to the complexities, diversities, and differences of the elements of 
order; an approach or approaches that link economic, social, psychic, emotional, 
spiritual, and musical orders and not only social and economic order; an approach that 
links order and rhythm and not just order and rules. 76 
 
Kieran Dolin poses a similar challenge when, inspired by the example of first nation cultures 
in Australia and elsewhere, and bearing in mind Robert Cover’s famous assertion that “the 
formal institutions of law, and the conventions of the social order are … but a small part of 
the normative universe that ought to claim our attention”,77 he asks: “Can music be 
paired with nomos in the same way as narrative, among the cultural materials that give shape 
and meaning to the law in the cultures of the West?”78 My own answer to that question is 
 
75 (1999) 20 Cardozo L Rev 1683 -1694. 
76 Ibid., 1694. 
77 R. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983-4) 
97(4) Harv Law Rev 4-68, 4. See, generally, J. Etxabe, “The Legal Universe After Robert 
Cover” (2010) 4(1) Law and Humanities 115–147. 
78 K. Dolin, “From Orpheus to Yothu Yindi: Music and Legal Cultures” (2016) 12(1) Law, 
Culture and the Humanities 29–38, 38. 
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“yes”, with the qualification that to do so will require us to acknowledge and exercise the 
metaphorical mode by which law and music work. Dolin notes that: 
 
In London, Sydney and probably elsewhere, the opening of the law year is marked by 
an ecumenical religious service. At one such service in Sydney in 2006, settings of 
the Psalms by George Palmer, a lawyer, judge and composer, were sung, including 
Psalm 118, “Lord I Love Your Commands.”79 
 
One can find similar ceremonial seepages of music and spirituality into the United Kingdom 
legislature, most clearly when the Queen’s Speech opens a new parliament. Occasions such 
as the opening of parliament and the opening of the law year are significant because they are 
liminal performances at the threshold between the business of state and the broader cultural 
and spiritual life of the nation, but they are also highly official occasions. Music and song 
have no inherent license to spill out spontaneously or to be heard within the chamber, still 
less any official right to be aired. 
The situation is rather different if we go back far enough along the timeline of 
Western democracy. In ancient Greece, for example, we find that music was far more 
integrated into the fabric of political life than it is now. The same culture that originally 
expounded our idea of “harmony” in terms of all elements of human and natural life joined 
together in proper and fitting (“artia”) way, did not isolate music from the serious business of 
State in the way that is generally done today. Neither was music isolated from the other 
expressive arts. Song, dance, and word were seamlessly combined in the notion of mousikē, 
 
79 Ibid., p.33. 
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which denoted the arts inspired by the Muses.  The authors of Music and the Muses,80 depart 
from the general practice of examining the various components of mousikē in isolation and 
instead consider its significance as an integrated expression of the social, religious, and 
educational practices of the polis. In a similar vein, M. Paola Mittica gives an account of the 
“art of mousiké as political activity”. In her article “When the world was mousiké”, she 
informs us that  
 
the political ideal of the identity between mousiké and lawgiving persists throughout 
the Archaic age, occurring both in the shape of a lawgiver, who must be skilled at 
making the principles of a higher law “resonate” through sweet and persuasive 
speech, and in that of a professional musician called upon to sustain the politics and 
education of citizenship. This ideal becomes concrete in historical reality with Solon, 
who embodies both lawgiver and poet. 81 
 
Mittica concludes that in this “we see a lesson which is still valid today: that we must reflect 
on the foundations of the principles that regulate our life in common”.82 Adding, which is 
apposite to our present concern, that  
 
 
80 P. Murray and P. Wilson, Music and the Muses: The Culture of Mousike in the Classical 
Athenian City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
81 M. P. Mittica, “When the world was mousiké: on the origins of the relationship between 
law and music”. (2015) 9.1 Law and Humanities 29-54, 53. 
82 Ibid., 54. 
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Now, as then, we believe that wisdom can come from a special poetic sensitivity, 
which permits us to grasp this idea of proportion and to use it in human affairs to 
bring about peaceful coexistence. The aim is to approach harmony according to its 
original meaning, namely “harmonizing differences”, without the temptation to 
establish a harmonious architecture once and for all, but with an awareness that the 
only constant in life lies in its growing multiformity.83 
 
Attention to the role of metaphor in expressing harmony is, for me, key to the “special poetic 
sensitivity” which Mittica rightly identifies as essential to a living sense of harmony in 
human affairs. I am mindful of Desmond Manderson’s suggestion that harmony is a value 
neutral concept with the result that the quality of the whole is only as good as the quality of 
the parts.84 I don’t wholly agree with that, for harmony surely imports a sense of diversity, 
and diversity is inherently more positive than uniformity in music, law and life. As Marc-
Antoine Charpentier opined in his treatise Les Règles de Composition:85 
Diversity alone produces perfection, whereas uniformity produces displeasure and 
dullness. Variations in movement and Form, done well, contribute marvellously to 
this diversity that music demands. […] Music that is composed only of Consonances 
 
83 Ibid. 
84 D. Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press 2000), 702. 
85 C. Cessac (ed), Les manuscrits autographes de Marc-Antoine Charpentier (Wavre: 
Éditions Mardaga, 2007) 201-221. 
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would be bland; and too full of Dissonances would be hard, because these two 
extremes offend against Diversity.86 
I do, however, agree with Manderson that bad parts make a bad whole, as bad voices make a 
bad choir and rotten planks a bad ship. Yet, even then, is it not likely that the worthy 
endeavour of producing a harmonious whole is the very practice that is most likely to reveal 
the fault in a part? The sense in which, and the extent to which, the crown and the common 
law were at fault in their dealings with the Whanganui river and its people were not apparent 
to the crown and common law on their own terms of property rights and crown prerogative. It 
was only through the practice of attempting harmony by attending to the song of the river – 
the articulation of Te Awa Tupua – that the crown and common law was enabled to see its 
own faulty part in the story.87 I hope, in any case, that Manderson’s entirely proper demand 
that “[a]ny specific proposal for or theory of harmonization…be supported or justified 
by…reasons or normative values” over and above the mere activity of combining distinct 
parts, will be met in the mode of joining or articulation advanced here: one that involves the 
participants in imagining a way to hear more fully all the voices that together produce the 
song. 
There is an echo of this sentiment in a challenge that James Boyd White’s lays down 
in Justice as Translation: 
 
 
86 Cessac, ibid., at 211. (My translation). 
87 I commend to the reader Richard Dawson’s Justice as Attunement: Transforming 
Constitutions in Law, Literature, Economics and the Rest of Life (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2013), which offers great insight into the practice of listening across cultural differences, 
including between Maori and Common law understandings of the world. 
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Listen to the voices: my voices and your own, as you hear yourself respond in 
different ways to what I say. There, in the music the voices make, whether beautiful 
and harmonious or raw and ugly, is where the meaning lies; it is to that music that our 
attention and judgment should above all be directed.88 
 
White is here writing about a practical method of listening, but he is also using the language 
of music and voice metaphorically to criticise the common assumption that our utterances 
satisfactorily express our inner thoughts. In fact, our expressions do not end with utterance, 
but begin there. It is only when the expression is outer, that it can attain complete 
performance. This is at least partly because it is only at the point of being uttered that the 
speaker can attend with a dispassionately critical ear to their own expression in the manner 
imagined by Hoffmann’s idea of Besonnenheit discussed earlier. One can try to hear one’s 
own inner voice, but the exercise is impractical until the idea has been expressed so as to be 
“out there” in some uttered form. To make the point by returning to the terminology with 
which this essay began, we can say that the solo part cannot fulfil its identity as part of the 
whole work unless it is harmoniously articulated. W. H. Breare wrote a guide to elocution 
that employs similar terminological distinctions and theoretical considerations in service of 
the practical art of speaking well.89 Having clarified some vernacular of vocal training (he 
writes of “pronunciation” of vowel sounds and “enunciation” of consonants combining to 
produce “articulation”),90 he advises that: 
 
88 White, Translation, 231.  
89 W. H. Breare, Elocution: Its First Principles (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1905). 
90 Ibid., 26. 
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great care must be taken that the various elements of a single vowel should evolve in 
those true proportions which realise perfect pronunciation AS IT REACHES THE 
AUDIENCE. A student cannot distinguish perfectly the results of his own vocal 
work, therefore he must be guided by his teacher or some one with an equally 
sensitive ear and discriminating mind.91  
 
Utterance is also important because this will bring home to the speaker the humbling 
realization that their own expression cannot be truly complete until it is heard by others, and 
heard alongside the utterances that others contribute to the choral whole. Leach writes in this 
vein about musical performance: 
 
the audience of an orchestra are interested in what all the instrumentalists and the 
conductor do in combination. The meaning of the music is not to be found in the 
“tunes” uttered by individual instruments but in the combination of such tunes, in 
their mutual relations, and in the way particular patterns of sound are transformed into 
different but related shapes.92 
 
When E. Leach writes in the same place that “the relations of harmony, which allow 
for the transposition of a melodic phrase from one instrument to another, are those of 
 
91 Ibid., 34-5. (The capitalised phrase is as it appears in the original.) 
92 E. Leach, Culture and Communication: The Logic by Which Symbols are Connected 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 33. 34  
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metaphor”,93 he is pointing to a distinction between melody as a musical line notated from 
side-to-side in the score and harmony as a collection of instrumental lines represented in the 
vertical axis. I have represented metaphor as a bridge or ferry moving from one side to 
another in the horizontal axis, but Leach is right to point out that there is also a sense in 
which metaphor works in the vertical axis. It connects higher abstract concepts to more earth-
bound concrete instances (whereas “love” is in the air, the “red, red, rose” is down in the soil 
and inhabits the earthy sensual world of colour, scent, touch). Metaphor in its harmonious 
mode can therefore be regarded as a bridge that makes its connections vertically. We might 
imagine it as something like the mythological Bifröst – the bridge in Norse myth that is said 
to connect the lower human world to the higher world of the gods. Hierarchical mythologies 
and societies frequently tend to think of harmony in this way. One such society was Rome; 
another was medieval and Tudor England with its pervasive notion of the “chain of being” 
connecting all beings and things from God at the top to the dust and mineral matter of the soil 
below; yet another was England during the Enlightenment, with its belief in (or hope for) 
harmonious constitutional relations between monarch and people.94 It was when thinking 
along the vertical axis that Cicero, in his De Re Publica, gave his Scipio the metaphor of 
musical harmony to account for civil harmony between different strata of society:  
For just as in the music of harps and flutes or in the voices of singers a certain 
harmony of the different tones must be preserved, the interruption or violation of 
which is intolerable to trained ears, and as this perfect agreement and harmony is 
produced by the proportionate blending of unlike tones, so also is a State made 
harmonious by agreement among dissimilar elements, brought about by a fair and 
 
93 Ibid., 33. 34  
94 J. Snape, n.10 above. 
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reasonable blending together of the upper, middle, and lower classes, just as if they 
were musical tones. What the musicians call harmony in song is concord in a State, 
the strongest and best bond of permanent union in any commonwealth; and such 
concord can never be brought about without the aid of justice.95 
Shakespeare has the same tradition, and perhaps the exact passage from Cicero, in mind 
when in Henry V he has Exeter say that: 
 
…government, though high and low and lower 
Put into parts, doth keep in one concent, 
Congreeing in a full and natural close 
Like music. (1.2.180-3)96 
 
Our musical sense of harmony is innate in us because it is naturally occurring. The pitch of 
wind blowing through reeds, of water dropping into pools, the rhythm of heartbeats, steps and 
days, all combine in us to turn sound into music.97 We are the conductors. We are the 
audience of the natural world and co-producers with it of the music it makes. Some lawyers 
 
95 Cicero, De Re Publica (On the Republic) C.W. Keyes trans. Loeb Classical Library 213 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928) II. XVII. 180-181.  
96 T. W. Craik (ed), King Henry V, The Arden Shakespeare, third series (London:  
Bloomsbury, 1995). 
97 On the natural source of musical order, a good starting place is the work of Gioseffo 
Zarlino, including Le istitutioni harmoniche, 1558. A. Carapetyan notes that “Zarlino refers 
the four elements to the four voices” (“The Concept of ‘Imitazione della natura’ in the 
Sixteenth Century (1946) 1.1.Journal of Renaissance and Baroque Music 47-67, 60). 
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reading this essay, even if they allow that we have stumbled upon answers, might doubt that 
the questions I have raised were ever ones that lawyers should ask. “What is the point of it?”, 
they might demand. If one has to ask that question, one should also ask “what is the point of a 
river?” and “what is the point of music?”. The answer is always the same. It is hard for 
lawyers and the literary-minded “to move, or to try to move, beyond the world of our 
languages”.98 We tend to write our laws down, and to read and write wordy texts like this 
one, and to think of the law as an exclusively written or spoken thing. We are always 
searching for just the right word. If we can avoid the Scylla of being seduced by words, we 
might fall into the Charybdis of supposing that moving beyond words must entail forward 
progress, a pushing into new territories; but that impulse to colonize is just crown-thinking. 
Movement can entail a new way of joining old things, and variations on old tunes. It can 
entail a remembering rather than a pushing forward. We can remember the waiata that 
occurred on the occasion of the Third Reading in the New Zealand parliament. We can 
remember the forsaken art of mousikē. We can remember Shakespeare’s wonderful word 
“congreeing”, which he coined from Latin to express the joining and articulation of parts into 
a pleasing whole. It was his new word for the old idea of “harmony”. Until we lawyers can 




98 J. B. White, The Edge of Meaning (Chicago, Univ of Chicago Press, 2001) 1. 
